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NECESSITY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
PETER W. HOGG* 
THE MANITOBA LANGUAGE RIGHTS REFERENCE 
The Situation in Manitoba 
In Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985),' the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that nearly all of the laws of the province of Manitoba were unconsti- 
tutional. There was no plausible way of escaping from this alarming con- 
clusion. Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, which is the constitution of the 
province of Manitoba: provided that Manitoba statutes were to be enacted in 
both the English and the French languages. In 1890, Manitoba enacted the 
Oficial Language Act, which provided that Manitoba statutes need only be 
enacted in the English language. In effect, this Act was an attempt to repeal a 
constitutional requirement. Not surprisingly, the Act was held to be invalid 
by county courts in 1892 and 1909, but these decisions were not appealed, 
were not reported, and were completely disregarded by the authorities in 
Manitoba. It was not until 1979 that a case in which the Ojicial LanguageAct 
was challenged reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Forest case 
(1979),3 the Court held that the Oficial LanguageAct was invalid by reason of 
its conflict with s.23 of the Manitoba Act. 
The decision in Forest meant that the Manitoba Legislature had to enact its 
statutes in both the English and the French languages. This requirement 
applied not only to statutes enacted after the Forest decision, but to statutes 
enacted before the decision as well. Manitoba's statutes had been enacted in 
English only ever since 1890, when the Ojicial Language Act was passed. 
Moreover, Manitoba had not been preparing unofficial French translations of 
its statutes. Manitoba was therefore faced with a massive task of translation 
and re-enactment. It embarked on this task rather slowly. In 1984, five years 
after the Forest decision of 1979, the Legislature was still enacting some 
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Formerly Senior 
Lecturer 1966-1 969, Reader 1970-1 971, Monash University. 
Part of this article, under the title, "Necessity in Manitoba", was delivered at a conference 
on "The Role of Courts in Society" at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1986. The 
papers have been published in S. Shetreet (ed.), Role of Courts in Society (Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); my paper appears at pp. 7-24. ' [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721. 
* The Manitoba Act, 1870 (Can.) created Manitoba out of a federal territory. Although a 
Canadian statute, it comprises part of the "Constitution of Canada" (defined in s.52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982) and can be altered only by the appropriate amending pro- 
cedures, which in the case of s.23 would require the assent of both the Parliament of 
Canada and the Legislature of Manitoba (as stipulated by s.43 of the Constitution Act, 
1982). 
A.-G. Man. v. Forest [I9791 2 S.C.R. 1032. 
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current statutes in English only, and none of the body of statutes enacted 
before 1979 had been re-enacted in the required bilingual format. 
The Holding of Invalidity 
The Forest case had not had to rule on the legal status of the large body of 
statutes that had been enacted in English only. This issue arose when a 
motorist named Bilodeau, who was charged with the offence of speeding, 
defended the charge on the ground that Manitoba's highway speed limits had 
been imposed by a statute that was invalid, because the statute had been 
enacted in English only. The Manitoba courts managed to reject this d e f e n ~ e , ~  
and Bilodeau appealed the case into the Supreme Court of Canada. For 
reasons that will be explained later in this article,' Bilodeau's conviction was 
eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.6 But Bilodeau was in- 
directly successful, in substance, in securing the legal ruling that he sought. 
When the Bilodeau appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
federal government (which assumes a protective role towards French-speak- 
ing minorities in the English-speaking provinces) became concerned that an 
appeal involving only two statutes might not yield a comprehensive ruling on 
the validity of Manitoba's statutes. The federal government accordingly 
directed a "reference" to the Supreme Court of Canada for an advisory 
opinion as to the validity of all of Manitoba's statutes that had been enacted in 
English only. (The reference is a procedure available to all Canadian govern- 
ments to obtain an advisory opinion from the  court^.)^ In Re Manitoba 
Language Rights (1 985),' the Supreme Court of Canada, rejecting the argu- 
ment advanced by the government of Manitoba that the constitutional 
requirement of bilingual enactment was "directory" only,9 held that the 
consequence of failure to comply with the constitutional requirement was 
invalidity. It followed that all of Manitoba's past and present statute law, 
except for those statutes enacted in both languages (all pre-1890 statutes and 
some post-1 979 statutes), was invalid. 
In Bilodeau v. A.-G. Man. 119811 5 W.W.R. 393 (Man. C.A.), the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal upheld Bilodeau's conviction. Two of the three judges held that the requirement 
of bilingual enactment in s.23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 was "directory" only, so that its 
breach did not result in the invalidity of the unilingual statutes. The third judge disagreed 
with this reasoning, holding that the requirement was "mandatory", but he agreed with 
the result, because he held that the laws enacted prior to the Forest decision were saved 
from invalidity by the principle of necessity. ' Text accompanying note 29, infra. 
Bilodeau v. A.-G. Man. [I9861 1 S.C.R. 449. 
The reference procedure, and the decisions upholding its constitutionality, are described 
in P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd edn, Toronto, Carswell, 1985), 177- 
183. 
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721. I disclose that I was one of the counsel for the Attorney General of 
Canada. 
This was the argument that had persuaded a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal: 
note 4, supra. 
Necessity in a Constitutional Crisis 
The Resulting Vacuum of Law 
If the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Rights Refer- 
ence had stopped at the point of its holding of general invalidity, the 
consequence would have been a vacuum of law in Manitoba. Under Canada's 
federal constitution, the provinces have responsibility for most of the private 
law, including contracts, torts, property, commercial law, succession, labour 
relations, industrial regulation and consumer protection. In Manitoba, the 
laws on all these topics, and many others, if enacted since 1890 in English 
only, would be invalid. The provinces also have responsibility for the courts, 
municipal institutions, school boards and many other regulatory or public 
bodies. In Manitoba, all these bodies, to the extent that they derived their 
existence or powers from laws enacted in English only, would be acting 
without legal authority. 
The Legislature of Manitoba would also be an invalid body. Although the 
Legislature was established by the Manitoba Act, 1870 (the constitution), the 
structure of the legislative assembly had been radically changed by laws 
passed since 1890 in English only: the size of the assembly had been increased 
from 24 to 57 members, women had been granted the right to vote and sit in 
the assembly, and persons aged 18 to 20 had also been granted the right to 
vote. It the laws pertaining to the franchise and the Legislature were invalid, 
then Manitoba would lack a Legislature. If this were so, the vacuum of law 
could never be filled. Past laws could not be re-enacted in both languages. 
Future laws could not be enacted, even in both languages. Even a remedial 
constitutional amendment seemed to be unavailable, because the Consti- 
tution of Canada stipulates that an amendment affecting only one province 
must be agreed to by "resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons 
and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment 
applies.1° If Manitoba lacked a lawful legislative assembly, it could not pass 
the requisite resolution. 
There were some common law doctrines that could provide some relief 
from the consequences of the invalidity of Manitoba's laws. The de facto 
doctrine would sometimes give validity to the acts of a public official with 
ostensible (but not legal) authority to perform his duties." The res judicata 
doctrine would preclude the re-opening of cases decided by the courts on the 
basis of invalid laws.I2 The mistake of law doctrine might preclude the 
recovery by taxpayers of taxes paid under an invalid law.I3 The trouble with 
these three doctrines is that each is quite limited in its scope or (in the case of 
the de facto doctrine especially) quite uncertain in its scope; and, as the Court 
lo Constitution Act, 1982, s.43; cf. note 2, supra. 
' I  See C. L. Pannam, "Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto Officers" (1 966) 2 F. L. Rev. 
37; see also the Court's discussion in [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 755-757. 
I* See G. Spencer Bower and A. K. Turner, Res Judicata (2nd Edn., London, Buttenvorths, 
1969). 
l 3  See J. D. McCamus, "Restitutionary Recovery of Monies Paid to a Public Authority 
under aMistake of Law" (1983) 17 U.B.C.L. Rev. 233; P. W .  Hogg, Liabilityofthe Crown 
(Carswell, 2nd edn, Toronto, 1989), 18 1-1 86. 
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acknowledged,I4 the doctrines would not cover all of the situations that could 
be questioned. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's Solution 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference 
faced an awkward dilemma. On the one hand, the integrity of Canada's 
constitution, with its protections for the French-speaking minority, required 
the Court to hold that Manitoba statutes enacted only in English were invalid. 
On the other hand, the Court could not thrust upon the people of Manitoba 
the chaos and disorder that seemed inevitable if the Court were to deny the 
efficacy of the legal system that was in fact in place. The solution devised by 
the Court was to hold that the Acts of the Legislature that were enacted only in 
English were invalid, but to hold as well that the Acts were to be "deemed to 
have temporary force and effect for the minimum period . . . necessary for 
their translation, re-enactment, printing and publication".15 The latter hold- 
ing protected the existing body of Manitoba laws, and all things done on the 
basis of past laws. Future laws, that is, the laws enacted after the date of the 
Court's opinion (June 13, 1985), had to comply with the constitutional re- 
quirements and did not benefit from the period of temporary validity.I6 
The Court's holding of temporary validity entailed a ruling as to the dur- 
ation of the minimum period necessary for the translation and re-enactment 
of Manitoba's unilingual laws. On this point, although some evidence had 
been adduced as to the scope of the task and the resources available to 
accomplish it, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient, and that the 
Court was incapable of determining the duration of the period of temporary 
validity; this issue was accordingly remitted to a special hearing of the Court 
to be convened later.17 
The special hearing for the determination of the period of temporary val- 
idity was held five months later (on November 4,1985) at which the Court, by 
consent of the parties,I8 fixed December 31, 1988 as the date by which 
Manitoba's consolidated statutes and regulations and rules of court were to be 
translated and re-enacted, and December 3 1, 1990 as the date by which all 
other laws were to be translated and re-enacted.19 Generally speaking, the 
effect of this order was to allow (1) a period of just over three years for the 
translation and re-enactment of all of the important current laws, and (2) a 
period of just over five years for the translation and re-enactment of less 
important current laws (private laws and unconsolidated public laws) and 
repealed or spent laws (some at least of which were to be translated and 
re-enacted to preclude the re-opening of transactions dependent upon their 
l4  [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 757. 
l 5  Id. 782. 
l6 Id. 768. 
l 7  Id. 769. 
l8  The Court's order was made with the consent of Manitoba, Canada (the government 
which had directed the reference), Quebec (which had intervened in the reference), Mr. 
Bilodeau (another intervenant) and three organizations of French-speakers (also inter- 
venants). 
l 9  Re Manitoba Language Rights: Order [I9851 2 S.C.R. 347. 
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validity).20 In the result, therefore, for several years the people of Manitoba 
will be bound by laws that were never constitutionally enacted. The laws 
derive their force exclusively from the order of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
The Court's Reliance on the Rule of Law 
What is the justification for this radical exercise of power by the Supreme 
Court of Canada? The reason offered by the Court for the temporary valid- 
ation of Manitoba's unilingual statutes was that a legal vacuum in the pro- 
vince would "undermine the principle of the rule of law"." According to the 
Court, there were two aspects to the rule of law. First, the rule of law required 
that the law be supreme over officials of the government as well as private 
individuals." This aspect of the rule of law is of course basic to constitution- 
alism, justifying courts in restraining arbitrary power by insisting upon fide- 
lity to the constitution and other laws. The second aspect of the rule of law, 
which was even more basic than the first, required simply that a community 
be governed by law.23 In this sense, the rule of law recognized that "[llaw and 
order are indispensable elements of civilized life".24 
In the Manitoba situation, the two requirements of the rule of law contra- 
dicted each other. The first requirement - the supremacy of the law over the 
organs of government - entailed that Manitoba's unilingual laws, since they 
had not been enacted in compliance with the law of the constitution, be held 
invalid. But the effect of such a holding was to deny to Manitoba an operating 
legal system in violation of the second reqirement of the rule of law. The 
Court's resolution of this conflict was to accord temporary force to the exist- 
ing body of Manitoba laws until such time as the Manitoba Legislature could 
comply with the law of the Constitution. 
The Court's decision thus made the concept of the "rule of law", which is 
usually a mere rhetorical flourish, the central justification for its preservation 
of Manitoba's de facto legal system. The Court claimed that the rule of law 
had "constitutional status", because it was referred to in the preamble to one 
of the instruments comprising the Constitution of Canada,25 and because it 
was "implicit in the very nature of a Constituti~n".~~ 
The Court did not directly rely upon a doctrine of "necessity", although 
courts in various parts of the common-law world had invoked such a doctrine 
to justify departures from constitutional legality. The Court referred to these 
20 Manitoba proposed to translate all repealed and spent laws back to and including the 
1970 revision of the Manitoba Statutes. Perfect safety required the province to go all the 
way back to 1890, but such a task was impossible. 
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 748. 
22 Ibid. 
'3 Id. 749. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1982 states: "Whereas Canada is founded on 
principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law:" 
26 [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 750. 
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cases, but treated them as supplying only "analogous support" for its order.27 
These cases are the subject of a later section of this article. 
The Bilodeau Case 
An ironic consequence of the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in the 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference was that it entailed the conviction of 
Mr. Bilodeau, the man whose determination and courage28 had brought the 
issue to the Court. He had been vindicated in his contention that the English- 
language statute under which he had been convicted was invalid. But, by 
virtue of the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the statute was deemed to 
have been in force when Bilodeau committed his offence; therefore, he was 
properly convicted under the Act. The Supreme Court of Canada was accord- 
ingly obliged to affirm his conviction, and, after a long delay which was 
perhaps intended to signal the Court's discomfort, the Court did affirm his 
conv i~ t ion .~~  
The Mercure Case 
One could be forgiven for assuming that the situation in Manitoba was 
unique. But it turned out that a similar vacuum of law existed in 
Saskatchewan as well. The province of Saskatchewan had been created by 
federal statute in 1 905.30 It had been carved out of the North-West Territories, 
which were federal territories governed by the federal parliament and gov- 
ernment. In 1877, when the small population of the Territories was half 
French-speaking, the federal Parliament enacted a law, similar to s.23 of the 
Manitoba Act, 1870, that required the ordinances of the Legislative Assembly 
of the Territories to be enacted in both the English and the French languages. 
By the time Saskatchewan was created in 1905, the wave of immigration to 
the prairies had greatly increased the population, and reduced the proportion 
of French-speakers to less than five per cent of the population. (It is about two 
per cent today.) The 1877 language law was apparently assumed to be inapp- 
licable in the new province, and from the beginning the Legislature enacted 
statutes in English only. 
It was not until the 1980s that anyone brought a legal challenge to the 
Saskatchewan Legislature's practice of English-only enactment. In R. v. Mer- 
cure (1 988),31 a French-speaking resident of Saskatchewan defended a charge 
of speeding on the ground that Saskatchewan's highway legislation had been 
invalidly enacted. The case rose to the Supreme Court of Canada, where a 
majority held that the 1877 language law was still part of the law of Sas- 
2' Id. 758. 
28 Bilodeau's position in the litigation was exceedingly unpopular in Manitoba, and he 
received much abuse. 
29 Bilodeau v. A.-G. Man. [ I  9861 1 S.C.R. 449. The appeal had been argued at the same time 
as the reference (June 1984), but the decison on the appeal was handed down eleven 
months after the decision on the reference. 
30 Saskatchewan Act, 1905 (Can.). The federal Parliament's power to create new provinces 
out of federal territories was conferred by the Constitution Act, 1871 (Imp.), s.4. 
31  [I9881 1 S.C.R. 234. 
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katchewan, and that it prescribed the manner and form of enactment of 
statutes by the Legislature. Since all Saskatchewan statutes had been enacted 
in English only, which was the wrong manner and form, they were all invalid. 
However, the principle of the Manitoba Language Rights Reference applied 
here too "to keep the existing laws temporarily in effect for the minimum 
period of time necessary for the statutes to be translated, re-enacted, printed 
and published in F r e n ~ h " . ~ ~  
Mercure thus decided that in Saskatchewan, as in Manitoba, the statute 
books were full of invalid statutes. However, the Court noted an important 
difference between the two provinces. In the case of Manitoba, the language 
requirement was an entrenched part of the constitution of the province, 
requiring a constitutional amendment for its repeal or a l t e r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  In the case 
of Saskatchewan, however, the language requirement was not part of the 
constitution. As a pre-confederation law, received at the creation of the pro- 
vince, it could be repealed or amended by the Saskatchewan Legislature - 
acting in the correct manner and form, needless to say. The Court actually 
suggested this solution in its reasons for judgment: "the legislature may resort 
to the obvious, if ironic, expedient of enacting a bilingual statute removing the 
restrictions imposed on it by [the 1877 language law] and then declaring all 
existing provincial statutes valid notwithstanding that they were enacted, 
printed and published in English only".34 To the distress of its French- 
speaking minority, the government of Saskatchewan took up this suggestion, 
and secured the enactment by the Legislature, in both English and French, of a 
statute that repealed the two-language requirement for the future and vali- 
dated all the statutes invalidly enacted in the past.35 
The province of Alberta was established at the same time as the province of 
Sa~katchewan,~~ and was carved out of the same federal territories. Since 
Alberta, like Saskatchewan, had never repealed or amended the 1877 lan- 
guage law, it was clear that the Mercure ruling must apply to Alberta as well. 
Therefore, Alberta was also faced with a wholly invalid body of statutes, 
although no doubt the statutes were temporarily in effect for the time needed 
to translate and re-enact them. Alberta, like Saskatchewan, took the easy 
route of enacting, in both languages, a curative statute.37 
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 
The American Civil War Cases 
In the United States, during the civil war, the Confederate states organized 
governments that did not conform to the requirements of the Constitution of 
the United States, and of course they waged war against the United States. 
32 Id. 280. 
33 Note 2, supra. 
34 [I9881 1 S.C.R. 234, 280-281. 
35 The Language Act, Stats. Sask. 1988, c. L-6.1. 
36 Alberta Act, 1905 (Can.). 
37 Languages Act, Stats. Alta. 1988, c. L-7.5. 
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After the war came to an end in 1865, the question arose whether the laws and 
acts of the Confederate state legislatures and governments were legally effec- 
tive. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the doctrine of 
necessity sustained these laws and acts, except those that were directed to the 
prosecution of the war against the United States. On this basis, the Court 
upheld a law incorporating an insurance company and a law authorizing 
trustees to invest in confederate bonds.38 In comparing these cases with the 
Manitoba Language Rights Refeence, it is interesting to notice that the 
Supreme Court of the United States did not give merely temporary effect to 
the Confederate laws, but accepted them as wholly valid. 
The Pakistan Case 
The doctrine of necessity was next applied in Pakistan. The Indian Inde- 
pendence Act, 1947 (U.K.) partitioned the Indian subcontinent and created 
the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. This Act was the original consti- 
tution of both countries, but the Act provided for a Constituent Assembly in 
each country, with power to enact new constitutional laws that would replace 
the provisions of the Act. In Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly met for 
seven years, during which time it enacted forty-four constitutional laws. 
However, because the Constituent Assembly wanted the new constitution to 
be "autochthonous", the Assembly deliberately omitted one of the formalities 
stipulated by the Indian Independence Act for the passage of constitutional 
laws, namely, the assent of the Governor General of P a k i ~ t a n . ~ ~  Unfortu- 
nately for autochthony, the Federal Court of Pakistan held that the assent of 
the Governor General was an essential requirement, and that its absence 
rendered void all of the constitutional laws enacted by the Constituent As- 
~embly.~' The Court also held that the omission could not now be repaired by 
the Governor General: an attempt by the Governor General to confer his 
assent retroactively on the laws enacted over the seven-year period was held to 
be legally ineffe~tive.~' 
The invalidity of the constituent process in Pakistan meant that not only 
were the forty-four constitutional laws invalid, but a great many laws and 
institutions that had been enacted or established under the invalid constitu- 
tional laws were also invalid. Faced with this situation, the Governor General 
issued a proclamation temporarily validating the forty-four invalid constitu- 
tional laws and everything done under those laws. This proclamation was to 
The leading cases are Texas v. White 74 U.S. 700 (1868) (Texas law facilitating bond 
transfer invalid, because purpose to raise funds for war against U.S.); Horn v. Lockhart 84 
U.S. 570 (1873) (Alabama probate court decree directing investment of estate funds in 
state bonds invalid, because bonds issued to raise funds for war against U.S.); United 
States v. Home and Southern Insurance Companies 89 U.S. 99 (1875) (Georgia laws 
incorporating insurance companies upheld); Baldy v. Hunter 17 1 U.S. 388 (1 898) (Geor- 
gia law authorizing trustees to invest estate funds in state bonds upheld). 
39 Autochthony requires that a constitution be indigenous. The idea was that, by omitting 
one of the formalities stipulated by the Indian Independence Act, the Constituent As- 
sembly's work would not derive its authority from the former colonial power, but from 
events solely within Pakistan. 
40 Federation ofPakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 306. 
41 UsifPatel v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 576. 
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remain in force only until the laws had been re-enacted or replaced by a new 
Constituent Assembly (which would include the assent of the Governor 
General). The Governor General's proclamation was not authorized by the 
express terms of the Indian Independence Act. Nevertheless, in Special Refer- 
ence No. 1 of 1955 (1 956),42 the proclamation was upheld by a majority of the 
Federal Court of Pakistan, relying on the doctrine of necessity. This case is 
unlike both the Manitoba case and the American civil war cases in that the 
Pakistan Court did not have to fashion a remedy of its own, but simply rule on 
the efficacy of the remedy fashioned and applied by the Governor General. 
The Cyprus Case 
The doctrine of necessity was next applied in Cyprus. The Constitution of 
Cyprus, which dated from 1960, when Cyprus achieved independence from 
the United Kingdom, established a diarchical form of government, with 
elaborate provisions for the sharing of power between the Greek majority and 
the Turkish minority. In particular, the constitution made provision for 
"mixed" courts (with judges from both communities) to try certain criminal 
cases, for a Supreme Constitutional Court (also with judges from both com- 
munities) to decide constitutional questions, and for the enactment of laws in 
both languages. These "basic articles" of the constitution were expressly 
declared to be unalterable by any means whatever. 
In 1963, there was an armed insurgency by Turkish Cypriots, who secured 
control over those parts of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish community, and 
who stopped the participation by Turkish Cypriots in the mixed courts, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and the Parliament and government. The 
Parliament of Cyprus (without its Turkish Cypriot members) purported to 
enact a law, in the Greek language only, that (1) abolished the constitutional 
requirements of mixed courts for the duration of the emergency; and (2) 
conferred on the Court of Appeal the jurisdiction vested by the constitution in 
the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
In Attorney General of Cyprus v. Mustafa Ibrahim (1 964),43 the Court of 
Appeal of Cyprus upheld the emergency law on the basis of the doctrine of 
necessity: in time of emergency, the express terms of the constitution could be 
overridden to secure the continued functioning of the courts. Of the three 
opinions written in the Court of Appeal, Josephides J. provided the clearest 
statement of the doctrine of necessity. He said that the doctrine was an 
"implied exception" to the express terms of the constitution, and that its 
purpose was "to ensure the very existence of the State".44 It became applicable 
when the following prerequisites were satisfied: 
"(a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circum- 
stances; 
(b) no other remedy to apply; 
(c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity; and 
42 P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 598. 
43 119641 Cyprus L.R. 195. 
44 Id. 265. 
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(d) it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the 
exceptional circum~tances."~~ 
When these prerequisites were satisfied, the doctrine of necessity authorized 
the Parliament "to deviate from the letter of the constitution, which had been 
rendered inoperative by the force of events."46 
The Cyprus case is like the Pakistan case, and unlike the Manitoba case and 
the American civil war cases, in that the Cypriot Court was not the author of 
the measures necessary to preserve the legal order. The Court's role was 
confined to upholding a measure promulgated by another institution of 
government, in this case, the Parliament of Cyprus. 
The Southern Rhodesia Case 
The remaining precedent for the existence of a doctrine of necessity arose 
out of Southern Rhodesia. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke (1 969),47 an 
appeal to the Privy Council from Southern Rhodesia, the question arose 
whether a person had been validly detained under legislation purportedly 
enacted by the legislature of Southern Rhodesia after the white minority 
government's "unilateral declaration of independence" from Britain in 1965. 
The Privy Council held unanimously that the breakaway government had not 
become the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia (as would be the case 
after a successful r ebe l l i~n) ,~~  because Britain was still claiming to be the 
lawful government and was taking steps to retain control. The question then 
arose whether a law of the unconstitutional legislature could nevertheless be 
treated as effective under the doctrine of necessity. On this point, the Privy 
Council divided. Lord Reid for the majority refused to uphold the detention 
law under the doctrine of necessity. He pointed out that the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom had enacted laws for Southern Rhodesia after the unilateral 
declaration of independence, and he concluded that "there is no legal vacuum 
in Southern Rh~desia".~'Lord Pearce for the minority would have upheld the 
detention law on the basis of necessity. He pointed out that the lawful 
government, the government of the United Kingdom, while it was asserting 
its authority from afar, was not actually collecting taxes, operating the police, 
the courts, or municipal institutions or attending to any of the day-to-day re- 
quirements of government. In his view, the principle of necessity required 
that the acts of the illegal government be held effective in order to avoid "a 
vacuum and chaos".50 
In Madzimbamuto, the doctrine of necessity was not applied, because of 
Lord Reid's majority view that there was no vacuum of law in Southern 
Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence. But the avail- 
45 Ibid. 
46 Id. 267. 
47 [1969] 1 A.C. 645. 
48 See S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th edn, Penguin, 1981), 
74-78. 
49 [1969] 1 A.C. 645, 729. 
50 Id. 740. 
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ability of the doctrine to fill a vacuum of law was assumed by Lord Reid for 
the majority as well as by Lord Pearce for the minority. 
NECESSITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Court referred to the 
necessity cases that have just been described, but the Court did not directly 
rely upon them, treating them as providing "analogous support" for the 
Court's rule-of-law rea~oning.~' It seems obvious that the decision could as 
easily have been framed in terms of necessity as of rule of law. Indeed, at one 
point the Court said that "the Province of Manitoba is in a state of emerg- 
e n ~ y " ' ~  - language of a kind to be found in the necessity cases. 
The Manitoba case, the civil war cases, the Pakistan case, the Cyprus case 
and the Southern Rhodesia case each arose out of a unique circumstance. The 
cases differ in the conditions that gave rise to the breach of the constitution. In 
two of the cases - Manitoba and Pakistan - the breach of the constitution 
was a more or less deliberate act (or omission) in peacetime, while in the other 
three situations the breach was caused by conditions of insurgency (falling 
short of a successful revolution). The cases also differ in the degree to which 
institutions other than the courts had attempted to repair the breach. In 
Pakistan, the Governor General had acted to preserve the invalid laws. In 
Cyprus, the legislature had acted. In those cases, the courts were essentially 
invited to ratify remedial measures designed by other organs of government. 
In the other cases, no steps had been taken to repair the constitutional breach, 
and the courts were invited to fashion directly a remedial measure, namely, a 
declaration that the de facto legal order was effective. 
Despite the factual differences, there is a common element in all these 
cases: a constitutional breach has occurred (for whatever reason) that cannot 
be quickly repaired and that is so radical that, if not condoned, it would cause 
a breakdown in the legal order. The doctrine of necessity, or (according to the 
Canadian Court) the rule of law, provides relief against the breakdown of the 
legal order, at least until such time as the constitutional breach can be pro- 
perly repaired.53 
What the Supreme Court of Canada did in the Manitoba Language Rights 
Reference was an extraordinary exercise of the judicial power: a large body of 
law, all enacted in breach of the constitution, was maintained in force on 
terms stipulated by the Court. It is appropriate to note, however, that the 
Court, like its counterparts in the United States, Pakistan and Cyprus did not 
have much choice. The alternative was (in the words of Josephides J. in the 
Cyprus case)54 "to cross its arms and do nothing" and witness "the paralysis" 
of the legal order. No other authority appeared to have any power to remedy 
51 [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 758. 
52 Id. 766. 
53 The Supreme Court of the United States in the American civil war cases did not make its 
ruling temporary so as to require the lawful post-civil-war legislatures to  ratify (or re- 
pudiate) the things done by the unlawful legislatures and governments. 
54 [I9641 Cyprus L. R. 195, 267-268. 
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the situation in Manitoba, and if some other means was attempted, perhaps 
through federal legislation, the other solution would inevitably wind up in 
front of the Court for a ruling as to its validity. The Court no doubt considered 
that it might as well decide the issue immediately, and the only conceivable 
disposition involved the preservation of Manitoba's legal order. By making 
the preservation order temporary, the Court affirmed an ultimate duty of 
fidelity to the letter of the constitution, and vindicated the rights of Mani- 
toba's French-speaking minority. 
